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make a huge difference to a nascent 
career. They are risky, of course, yet 
they are important and give one the 
freedom to follow new ideas and take 
some chances. Now, of course, I wish 
there were more such awards for 
mid- career scientists!
What was your favorite conference? 
‘Evolution — The Molecular 
Landscape’, a Cold Spring Harbor 
Symposium celebrating the Darwin 
bicentenary. It lasted six days, and 
the talks often went to 11p.m.; it was 
exhausting, presentations were all first-
rate, but best were the interactions 
before, between and after the sessions. 
And, it was an energizing mix of 
disciplines from paleontology to the 
origins of life to evolutionary genetics 
and philosophy. The lobster dinner 
wasn’t bad either. 
What is your favorite book? It is 
hard, no impossible, to name one 
favorite. But, I recently read Francis 
Crick: Discoverer of the Genetic Code 
by Matt Ridley on a trans-Atlantic 
flight. It read, as one reviewer put it, 
“like a guilty pleasure.” It was intriguing 
to learn more about the man behind 
the science.
Where is evolutionary biology 
heading? Evolutionary biology is in 
large part about reconstructing the 
past. One of the things I am excited 
about is our increasing ability to do 
just that with true genetic precision. 
For example, by identifying mutations 
that affect phenotypes, we can start 
to reconstruct traits of extinct species. 
Already, using phylogenetic methods, 
we can reconstruct ancient opsin-gene 
sequences to learn about dinosaur 
vision. Using ancient DNA, we now 
know some Neanderthals were red-
headed, and some mammoths were 
blonde. Now imagine reconstructing 
or sequencing whole genomes and 
being able to predict the morphology, 
physiology or even behavior of 
ancient creatures! To what extent 
this will be possible is still unclear, 
but if we have reliable data, we can 
properly understand the direction and 
nature of evolutionary change in an 
unprecedented way. That, surely, is the 
ultimate goal of our field.
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What is the ‘levels of selection’ 
question about? It’s about the 
level of the biological hierarchy at 
which natural selection acts, e.g. 
individual, group, gene, community, 
species, etc. Usually when we 
think about selection, we think of it 
acting at the level of the individual 
organism, favouring the fittest 
individuals over the less fit and thus 
leading to evolutionary change. But 
individual-level selection is only 
one possibility among many. For 
the key requirements of evolution 
by natural selection — variation, 
associated differences in fitness and 
heritability — can in principle be met 
by entities at many levels, above and 
below that of the individual organism. 
For example, a selective process 
could quite easily operate on groups 
of organisms, favouring some types 
of groups over others. This idea is 
known as ‘group selection’. 
What is the origin of the levels 
of selection debate? Like much in 
evolutionary biology, it traces back 
to Darwin. Though Darwin primarily 
discussed individual-level selection, 
he was aware of other possibilities. In 
The Descent of Man (1879), he tackled 
the problem of how self-sacrificial 
and other ‘altruistic’ behaviours 
could have evolved in early hominids. 
As such behaviours reduce an 
individual’s fitness, it is clear that they 
cannot have evolved by selection at 
the individual level. Darwin suggested 
that group selection may be the 
answer. Groups in which altruistic 
behaviour was prevalent may have 
enjoyed a selective advantage over 
groups in which it was absent, he 
argued. Another early evolutionist who 
discussed the levels question was 
August Weismann, mainly in relation 
to selection at the sub-organismic 
level. However, the modern debate 
only really took off in the 1960s with 
the rise of social evolution theory, and 
the ensuing controversy over group 
selection.
Why did ‘group selection’ become 
such a chequered concept in 
Quick guide the 20
th century? Primarily due 
to George C. Williams’ trenchant 
critique; also influential was the 
work of John Maynard Smith. They 
argued that group selection was 
theoretically possible but unlikely 
to be a major evolutionary force, 
and was not needed to explain 
the known biological phenomena 
anyway. Also, they stressed the 
fallacy of assuming that selection 
on individual organisms would 
automatically lead to outcomes 
that benefit the group. This fallacy 
was surprisingly common in 
mid- 20th century biology and is 
still encountered today. The rise 
of ‘kin selection’ also contributed 
to the demise of group selection. 
Biologists  such as Richard Dawkins 
and John Maynard Smith argued 
that kin selection or inclusive fitness 
theory, first articulated by William 
D. Hamilton in the 1960s, provided 
a better explanation of phenomena 
such as altruism which had 
traditionally been taken as evidence 
for group selection. However, the 
true relation between kin and group 
selection is a controversial matter. 
Many modern theorists argue that 
suitably understood they are in fact 
equivalent, so do not constitute 
alternative scientific hypotheses 
at all.
But isn’t the gene the real unit 
of selection? Dawkins originally 
presented his ‘selfish gene’ idea as 
an empirical alternative to individual 
and group-level selection, but later 
realised the error of his ways. Almost 
any selection process, at any level, 
will ultimately lead to a change 
in gene frequencies, so can be 
described as a process in which one 
gene spreads at the expense of its 
alleles. Thus, it is generally wrong to 
contrast ‘gene selection’ with either 
individual or group selection — there 
is no empirical issue at stake here. 
This was the point that Dawkins later 
captured with his ‘replicator– vehicle’ 
distinction; others have marked 
it by contrasting units and levels 
of selection. In recent literature, 
‘gene- level selection’ is often used 
in a restricted sense, to mean 
selection between genes within 
a single organism, as occurs in 
cases of intra-genomic conflict, 
e.g. meiotic drive. In this sense, 
most selection processes cannot be 
described as gene selection.
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neurobiology. In the first application 
of this approach, children with autism, 
which have profound impairments in 
theory of mind and social interactions, 
were found to make stereotypical 
judgments based on race and 
gender, just like typical children [5]. 
Here, we used the same task [5] (see 
Supplemental information available on-
line with this issue) to investigate racial 
and gender stereotyping (Figure 1A) in 
a group of twenty children with WS (10 
female and 10 male) aged 7 to 16 years 
(M = 12.9; SD = 2.8), and twenty 
control children aged 5 to 15 years 
(M = 7.0; SD = 1.8), individually 
matched to WS participants on gender 
(10 female and 10 male) and mental 
age (F (1, 38) = 2.97, p > 0.09). As a 
group, the participants with WS had 
IQs within the usual range for this 
condition, but contained a proportion 
of high- performing, normal IQ subjects. 
Confirming previous work, the control 
children showed strong pro-Caucasian 
bias (X2 (1,19) = 60.33, p < 0.001). In 
contrast, no evidence of race bias was 
found with the WS children (Figure 1B), 
whose scores were not statistically 
different from 50% (X2 (1,19) = 28.0, p > 
0.05), indicating that they attributed 
positive and negative features 
equally to Caucasian (in- group) and 
non- Caucasian (out-group) characters. 
Conversely, sex-role bias was 
pronounced and identical in the two 
groups (p > 0.99), indicating that absent 
racial stereotypes were not due to an 
overall feature attribution impairment. 
Chronological age differences between 
the WS and the control groups, or 
intellectual difficulties in WS children 
were unrelated to these findings (see 
Supplemental information).
To our knowledge, this is the first 
indication of the absence of racial 
stereotyping in a human group. While 
it is possible in principle that children 
with WS were differentially exposed 
to other ethnicities, this is unlikely 
as they were recruited from similar 
social backgrounds, and stereotypes 
emerge in normally developing children 
without such exposure [1]. Our results 
therefore indicate that it was WS that 
had dissociable effects on gender 
and race bias, suggesting differential 
neurobehavioral mechanisms for the 
development and/or maintenance of 
these stereotype categories. 
As stated, reduced social fear 
is a hallmark characteristic of WS, 
linked to overfriendliness and social 
disinhibition, even with individuals 
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Stereotypes — often implicit 
attributions to an individual based 
on group membership categories 
such as race, religion, age, gender, 
or nationality — are ubiquitous in 
human interactions. Even three-year 
old children clearly prefer their own 
ethnic group and discriminate against 
individuals of different ethnicities [1]. 
While stereotypes may enable rapid 
behavioural decisions with incomplete 
information, such biases can lead 
to conflicts and discrimination, 
especially because stereotypes can 
be implicit and automatic [2], making 
an understanding of the origin of 
stereotypes an important scientific 
and socio-political topic. An important 
process invoked by out-groups is 
social fear [3]. A unique opportunity 
to study the contribution of this 
mechanism to stereotypes is afforded 
by individuals with the microdeletion 
disorder Williams syndrome (WS), 
in which social fear is absent, 
leading to an unusually friendly, high 
approachability behaviour, including 
towards strangers [4]. Here we show 
that children with WS lack racial 
stereotyping, though they retain gender 
stereotyping, compared to matched 
typically developing children. Our 
data indicate that mechanisms for the 
emergence of gender versus racial 
bias are neurogenetically dissociable. 
Specifically, because WS is associated 
with reduced social fear, our data 
support a role of social fear processing 
in the emergence of racial, but not 
gender, stereotyping.
A variety of cognitive, social/
behavioural and emotive processes 
could in principle contribute to 
stereotyping. The study of populations 
with clear impairments in these 
functions can therefore provide 
information about the underlying 
CorrespondenceHow does the levels of selection question relate to the ‘major 
evolutionary transitions’? Such 
transitions, as defined by Eörs 
Szathmáry and John Maynard Smith, 
occur when free-living biological 
units, capable of surviving and 
reproducing alone, coalesce into 
a single larger unit, giving rise to a 
new, higher-level individual — for 
example, in the evolution of multi-
celled organisms from single-celled 
ancestors. In transitions of this sort, 
there is the potential for selection 
to act on both the smaller and the 
larger units — the individuals and 
the groups. For the groups to evolve 
into ‘real’ individuals, i.e. integrated 
cohesive units, group-level 
selection must trump individual-
level selection. So multiple levels of 
selection are intimately involved with 
evolutionary transitions.
What about species selection? 
This was an idea defended by 
Stephen J. Gould and other 
macroevolutionists, which says 
that selection may operate on 
whole species over geological time, 
favouring those species best able to 
survive or reproduce (i.e. speciate). 
This could explain why certain 
types of species, e.g. ecological 
specialists, become more common 
than others, e.g. generalists, in a 
given clade, and thus indirectly 
help explain long-term evolutionary 
trends. Species selection is certainly 
a logical possibility, but it is 
difficult to assess how important an 
evolutionary process it has been.
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